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Abstract The “Business Ecosystem” is one of the emerging key concepts of 
competitive strategy. Although most research has been centered on the hub-firms within 
its ecosystem, it is niches that are responsible for creating most of the value in it. Thus, we 
focus on niches and separate them into four types, which are Challengers, Defenders, 
Replicators and Opportunity Seekers. According to our empirical study in the Japanese 
video game industry, the performance exhibited by each niche varies. In addition, we 
indicate the potential for maintaining the health of the ecosystem by having each niche 
play a complementary role for the ecosystem.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the focus of competition has begun to be placed not on competition 
between firms within the same industry, but on competition between platforms in the 
form of hub firms such as Microsoft, Apple and Google. Incorporating the innovations of 
other firms into one’s own platform or forming cooperative networks with players 
centered on complementors have become vital elements for hub firms in developing a 
strong platform and gaining a competitive advantage in this context.
The business ecosystem (hereinafter referred to as “ecosystem”) has been focused 
upon in recent years as a form of research on such platforms. The concept of ecosystem is 
a framework that focuses upon the interdependence of firms and uses the ecosystem in 
the natural world as a metaphor to express those cooperative networks.
This ecosystem research may present new findings regarding competition between 
platforms, but it cannot be said that sufficient research has been accumulated. In 
particular, there is a lack of discussion about the niches that are believed to create much of 
value in an ecosystem. Although hub firms have been classified into categories such as 
2keystones and physical dominators, no such classification has been carried out for niches.
Therefore, this research focused upon niches responsible for generating value in the 
ecosystem by being aware of the types of niches hub firms should capture to become 
keystones and what kind of niches exist in rich ecosystems. In addition, we derive 
hypotheses related to strategies and performance of each niche type and examine this 
based upon empirical data.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1. Related Research on Business Ecosystems
One area that must be covered in the field of business ecosystems is research on 
platforms. A platform provides infrastructure and rules for mutually creating innovation 
by linking together several different user groups (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2002). Platform research covers arrangements related to transactions and 
alliances, or interfaces, because primary focus is placed upon niches that are directly 
linked to a firm. Gawer & Cusumano (2002), who are representative of researchers on 
platforms, examine the relationships with niches by primarily focusing their analysis on 
the behavior of platform firms and how they can attain hegemony and increase the value 
they gain.
Meanwhile, the business ecosystem began with research by Moore (1993, 1996) and 
typically uses the ecosystem in the natural world as a metaphor to represent the 
cooperative networks formed between investors, partners, suppliers and customers. 
Research on ecosystems, which had a broad and vague scope of analysis, was significantly 
systemized by Iansiti & Levien (2004). Since this research, research on ecosystems has 
been published in academic journals (Adner, 2006; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Isckia, 2009; 
Pierce, 2009; Tee & Gawer, 2009).
Iansiti & Levien (2004) have made at least two contributions. One was the 
clarification of ecosystem performance indicators. They suggested using the ecosystem’s 
health as an indicator of its performance, and stated that this could be measured by using 
productivity, robustness and niche creation as three indicators. ROIC (rate of return on 
invested capital) is a typical indicator of productivity. Indicators of robustness include the 
degree that the network between players is being maintained, such as the death rate of 
niches in an ecosystem and trading relationships. In addition, niche creation measures the 
degree of creation of new niches within an ecosystem and the degree of creation of 
innovative new products and technologies.
The other contribution they made was the classification of the roles of players 
3within the ecosystem. They differentiated the players within a network into hub firms and 
niche firms surrounding the hub firms, and also classified the hub firms. Hub firms that 
increase the health of the ecosystem in the long term were classified as “keystones” and 
those that weaken it in the long term were classified as “physical dominators”. 
Although a keystone has not significant presence in the ecosystem, it leaves most of 
the value created by the whole within the ecosystem, providing business opportunities to 
niches and energizing the ecosystem. In contrast, a physical dominator integrates niche 
firms horizontally and vertically, controls the ecosystem and attempts to generate value 
alone. In order to obtain much of the value generated by the ecosystem for itself, it avoids 
providing business opportunities to niche firms and it is claimed that this weakens the 
ecosystem in the long term.
The following observations can be made when comparing such platform research 
with ecosystem research. First, ecosystem research focuses on the entirety that is not 
directly connected to oneself. Whereas typical platform research tends to focus upon 
niches directly connected to hub firms, ecosystem research discusses niches only indirectly 
connected to hub firms and the ecosystem as a whole including relationships that cannot 
be reduced to individual elements.
This indicates that ecosystem research also focuses upon other firms and the 
surrounding networks. It is believed that hub firms are affected not only by directly 
connected niche firms, but also niche firms in alliances with them, rival hub firms that 
have dealings with those niche firms and any other party indirectly connected through the 
network. This is the second characteristic.
The third is that adopting multiple positions instead of establishing the perspective 
of a particular player is problematic. The interdependence of the players within an 
ecosystem is an issue, and attention is given to hub firms based on an understanding of 
niches and to niches based on an understanding of hub firms. The above contrast is 
illustrated in Table 1.
4Table 1. Comparison of Platform and Ecosystem Research
Platform Research Ecosystem Research
Focus Own firm Other firms and whole
Focus on value capture Focus on value creation
Links Direct (dyad) Indirect (network)
Single faceted (single unit) Multi faceted (multiple units)
Dependence Interdependence
2.2. Limitations of Prior Ecosystem Research
As described above, ecosystem research is characterized by the formulation of 
strategies based on consideration of the actions of others and the overall impact based on 
a multi-perspective. However, even in the most advanced systematic organization of 
ecosystem research conducted by Iansiti & Levien (2004), these characteristics have not 
been fully utilized.
That is because attention has been directed toward the behavior of hub firms 
themselves. The classification into keystone or physical dominator is focused solely upon 
the behavior of hub firms themselves with regard to what they should do to gain 
hegemony and become keystones or what behavior will result in them becoming physical 
dominators. This self-contained discussion of hub firms does not adopt the perspective of 
niches, which create much of the value in an ecosystem, and ignores the unique multi-
perspective approach of the ecosystem. Hub firms are not simply able to become 
keystones of their own accord. They only become keystones once they surround 
themselves with niches that help make the ecosystem healthier. Therefore, it is necessary 
to classify niches and gain a deeper understanding of the behavior of niches and the 
prosperity of the ecosystem.
2.3. Analysis Approach Using Classification of Niches
What kind of niches should hub firms surround themselves with and what kind of 
niche behavior should be encouraged to make an ecosystem prosper? The key is niches’ 
“dependence on hub firms” in a multi-platform environment. According to the approach 
adopted in ecosystem research, niches need to be free from excessive domination by hub 
firms and must maintain their own energy. To do this, niches must appropriately manage 
their dependence on resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) while maintaining appropriate 
5dependence without concentrating transactions on a single firm (Porter, 1980).
Multi-platform strategy (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2009) focuses on this point. A Multi 
Platform Niche (MPN) refers to a niche that creates and maintains relationships with 
multiple platforms to maximize its own interests in the long term. Its opposite is a Single 
Platform Niche (SPN). According to prior research, an MPN has advantages over an SPN 
such as better risk dispersion, better use of economy of scope and more efficient resource 
allocation (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2009; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Uzzi, 1996).
The basic approach of the multi-platform strategy concerns the kind of dependence 
a niche has on multiple platforms. Does it have relationships with a single platform or 
multiple platforms? Even if it does have relationships with multiple platforms, is the 
niche’s dependence on them equal and does the dependence change? If it does change, 
Table 2. Characteristics of Niche Types
Niche Type Challenger Defender Replicator Opportunity
Seeker
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6what kind of pattern does this change follow? In this research, we categorize niches into 
four types based not only on links to platform firms, but also changes in dependence.
The four types of niches shown in the table change their ties and dependence 
according to their goals and strategies. Therefore, one type of niche is not necessarily 
superior to other types in all ways. Hypotheses on how each niche pursues performance 
are presented below.
According to ecosystem research, it is preferable for a niche to maintain 
relationships with several platforms. However, it is better to have stable ties with a single 
platform in order to spark innovation. The reason for this is that attempting to support 
multiple platforms will prevent niches from optimization to a specific platform. Without 
such optimization, it would be more difficult for niches to target their main customers 
and take advantage of the distinctive technology of the platform (Caplado, 2007; 
Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Moran, 2005). In this research, we refer to Single Platform 
Niches that have ties with a single platform and attempt to face new challenges as a 
“Challenger.” Challenger niches are believed to maintain the health of the ecosystem by 
promoting the creation of new markets and the creation of niches.
Conversely, in terms of productivity, it is more advantageous to have ties with 
several platforms (Echoles & Tsai, 2005; Hagiu & Yoffie, 2009; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; 
Uzzi, 1996). Investment in development can also be recovered with less risk and greater 
stability. Two hypotheses concerning innovation and productivity can be derived from 
this.
 H1: Single Platform Niches have a higher level of innovation than Multi Platform 
Niches.
 H2: Multi Platform Niches have a higher level of productivity than Single Platform 
Niches.
Furthermore, there are several conceivable methods used to increase productivity by 
niches linked to multiple platforms. The first is a high-risk, high-return strategy. This 
involves awareness of network externality and utilizes multiple platforms according to the 
opportunities presented (Eisenmann et al., 2006). This kind of niche is called an 
“Opportunity Seeker.” An Opportunity Seeker is a niche that identifies business 
opportunities, changes its main platform and dramatically shifts its dependence. Drastic 
reallocation of resources is carried out if there is an opportunity, and although there is 
much fluctuation in productivity due to this reallocation being hit-and-miss, this type of 
7niche contributes to the productivity of the ecosystem.
The opposite is a low-risk, low-return strategy. Even when dealing with multiple 
platforms, transaction costs can be reduced by keeping the main client fixed (Williamson, 
1985). Niches adopting this strategy are called “Defenders.” These are niches that keep 
their main platform fixed and do not make any extreme changes to dependence in their 
relationships. Defenders are forming strong ties so that they can form trust and avoid 
opportunism (Uzzi, 1996). Thus, Defenders have the smallest fluctuations in productivity 
and contribute to increase the robustness of the ecosystem. 
Finally, there is a strategy that limits risks while seeking reasonable returns. This 
strategy utilizes the economy of scope through the repeated use of development assets 
across multiple platforms (Gimeno & Woo, 1999). This kind of niche is called a 
“Replicator.” Replicators are niches that switch their main platform in a short timeframe 
and make incremental changes in dependence in order to efficiently recover development 
investment. Hypotheses 3a-3b concerning robustness can be derived from the assertions 
above.
 H3a: Opportunity Seekers have larger fluctuations in productivity than Defenders or 
Replicators.
 H3b: Defenders have smaller fluctuations in productivity than Replicators or 
Opportunity Seekers.
3. Research Design
3.1. Data Collection 
The study covers the ecosystems of Nintendo Co., Ltd. (NTD) and Sony Computer 
Entertainment (SCE) in the Japanese video game industry (Xbox was excluded from the 
study because its market share was only 2 percent in Japan). There are two reasons that we 
chose to cover the video game industry. One is that because the ecosystem of the game 
industry has a simple structure made up of two opposing platforms and niches, niche 
strategies are easy to observe. Another is that the dynamism of the ecosystem can be 
comprehensively observed because of the rapid changes in the industry (Fine, 1998; 
Srinivasan & Venkatraman, 2009).
Data was collected using the list of the 500 best-selling games shown in The Annual 
Video Game Industry Report published by Mediacreate CO., Ltd. Data was created for 
4,500 titles over 9 years with 49,500 cells of data under titles such as development costs. 
Annual sales and development costs for each publisher and the number of titles for each 
8platform were calculated based on this data set. Using the procedures above, 469 samples 
were eventually obtained over an observation period of 9 years. However, merged firms 
were treated as samples combining the figures for the pre-merger firms.
3.2. Measures
To begin with, the method used to categorize niches is shown here. Figure 1 shows 
the Japanese video game industry networks consisting of NTD, SCE and niches in 2008 
as drawn using UCINET6.0 (Bogatti et al., 2002). The circles with bold outlines indicate 
platforms and the black circles are niches. The size of the circles indicates sales. The 
thickness of the grey lines indicates the strength of ties calculated based on the number of 
software titles provided (Srinivasan & Venkatraman, 2009; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004).
Figure 1. Japanese Video Game Networks in 2008
Niche firms that only released titles for one platform (SPN) during the period 
studied have been categorized as Challengers (the niche shown at the far right or left of 
Figure 1). A firm is categorized as an MPN1 if it has sold even one title for both platforms 
(the niche in the center of Figure 1). Among these MPNs, a Defender supplies software 
for both platforms and the platform dependence ratio2, or supply ratio has never been 
reversed (e.g. Figure 2. KOEI). A Replicator is a niche firm that supplies software for both 
platforms and has reversed the dependence ratio on numerous occasions. Finally, an 
9Figure 2. Typical Patterns of Temporal Dependence Change 
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Opportunity Seeker is a niche firm that supplies software for both platforms and has 
reversed the dependence ratio only when a change in dominance occurs. During the 
period being studied, such a change occurred only once in the video game industry (SCE 
was dominant until 2004 when NTD released the DS and later the Wii in 2006, 
resulting in a shift to NTD3). Therefore, niche firms that have reversed their dependence 
ratio two or more times are categorized as Replicators (e.g. Figure 2. HUDSON). And 
niche firms that have reversed their dependence ratio only once are categorized as 
Opportunity Seekers (e.g. Figure 2. NAMCO BANDAI GAMES). Using the procedures 
above, categorical variables were given to each of the four strategic types of niche firms.
In order to measure these three performance aspects in the video game industry, the 
three measures of Innovativeness, Productivity and Stability have been developed (See the 
Appendix). Innovativeness is a measure for indicating how innovative products and 
services created are (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). The Annual Video Game Report listed titles 
that cannot be categorized into existing game categories as ETC titles4. ETC is the genre 
that it cannot be classified into any genres. So, we use the ratio of ETC titles among all 
titles released was used as the measure of innovativeness. Productivity is a measure for 
indicating how efficiently products and services create value (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). In 
this study, productivity was measured using the return on investment in terms of how 
many times video game development costs can be recouped in sales. Sales of each software 
title (by platform) were divided by development costs to calculate the annual average for 
each publisher. Stability is a measure of how little productivity varies. Here, stability was 
simply measured by calicurating variance of productivity. A lower value indicates little 
variance in productivity and high stability.
4. Results
Table 3 reports descrptive statistics of niche’s charastaristics by each type. Data was 
consisted of 144 firms (unique niches) and 469 firms during 9 years observations. 
Annually there are approximately 52 niches that form the Japanese video game ecosystem 
except for platform firms, such as Nintendo or Sony Computer Entertainment. These 
average niches release 5.5 titles (average sales per title is 427 million yen) and earn around 
3.6 billion yen. Thus, the whole ecosystem creates 190 billion yen per year. However, a 
significant difference in sales was observed among niche (standard deviation is 8660×106).
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the performance of niches and the test 
results for the difference between the averages of groups. The ANOVA model was utilized 
to test the difference between groups. 
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Table 3. Statistical Description of Niche Characteristics
All Challenger Defender Replicator Opportunity
Seeker










Sample size 469 220 113 53 83
The number of titles Mean 5.51 1.51 4.97 8.64 14.87
S.D. 9.50 .89 5.78 6.26 17.46
Sales
(Million yen)
Mean 3,640 452 3,201 4,560 12,110
S.D. (106) 8,663 641 5,171 4,637 16,650
Average sales per title
(Million yen)
Mean 427 289 500 465 668
S.D. (106) 524 345 378 295 936
Table 4. Performance Measurements by Niche Strategy Type
Challenger Defender Replicator Opportunity
Seeker
F-value
Innovativeness Mean .13(220) .02(113) .08(53) .05(83) 5.58**
S.D. .32 .11 .18 .14
Productivity Mean 8.42(220) 10.44(113) 11.37(53) 16.38(83) 3.59*
S.D. 0.95 1.06 1.93 7.50
Stability Mean 91.83(171) 71.70(113) 120.54(53) 706.37(83) 11.26**
S.D. 280.61 116.43 237.17 1897.16
Significance: *p<.05  **p<.001
Parentheses show the number of observations
As is explained above there are three hyposeses to test. First, Hypothesis 1 states that 
Challenger SPNs have higher innovativeness than other niches. The innovativeness of 
Challengers (0.13) is the highest among all of the niche groups and is statistically 
significant ( p<0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Second, Hypothesis 2 states that MPNs have higher productivity than SPNs. In our 
results shown in Figure. 3, the productivity of Defender, Replicator, Opportunity Seeker 
MPNs is 10.44, 11.37, and 16.38 respectively, which is higher than the 8.42 productivity 
of Challenger SPNs. The difference between these averages is statistically significant 
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( p<0.05), supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Third, Hypothesis 3 states that Opportunity Seeker's have larger fluctuations in 
productivity than Defenders or Replicators. And Hypothesis 3b states that Defenders 
have smaller fluctuations in productivity than Replicators or Opportunity Seekers. 
According to our results, the highest stability was seen for Defenders (71.70) and the 
lowest stability was for Opportunity Seekers (706.37). The difference between the 
averages of groups was statistically significant ( p<0.01) , supporting Hypoteses 3a and 
Hypotesis 3b.
5. Discussion
We have classified niches into four categories and sought out the roles they play. If 
the world-leading Japanese video game industry has created a rich ecosystem, why is the 
dependence of each of these four niches so important? Here, we discuss this logic based 
upon the results of testing our hypotheses.
An ecosystem requires a niche that is able to launch a platform or break it out of 
stagnation. This role is played by Challengers. As supported by Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
Challengers that are Single Platform Niches are inferior to Multi Platform Niches in 
terms of productivity, but are able to provide hub firms with highly innovative software. 
Recently, educational institutions and publishing companies have been providing 
software that are completely different to conventional games, such as language tests and 
dieting software. However, the scale of activity of these highly innovative Challengers is 
limited (average of 1.5 titles5), and they are unable to create many titles in a short period 
of time. A single failure can be fatal, and they are unable to contribute much in terms of 
either productivity or robustness.
Opportunity Seekers are niches that complement this and raise the productivity of 
the ecosystem. Actually, the Final Fantasy series and the Dragon Quest series from 
SQUARE ENIX, which falls into this category, have been major hits that have provided 
much profit to hub firms. However, because Opportunity Seekers always ‘back the 
winning horse (Leibenstein, 1950)’, they do not provide profits to hub firms which are in 
downturn. Furthermore, as supported by Hypothesis 3a, there is much fluctuation in 
productivity depending on whether the niche produces hits because resources are 
concentrated on opportunities that have been identified.
Because of this, the ecosystem becomes unstable unless there are niche firms that 
will not cast aside the hub firm even when faced with a crisis. This role is played by 
Defender niches. As supported by Hypothesis 3b, Defender niches increase the robustness 
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of the ecosystem as a whole by ensuring its own stable relationships and performance. In 
fact, KOEI are not only reducing transaction costs, but also optimizing for certain hub 
firm’s platform attributes. For example, Dynasty Warriors (Sangoku Musou in Japanese) 
series optimize for the high level of image processing provided by SCE.
Replicators provide a balanced strengthening of these complementary relationships. 
This niche increases the productivity and the robustness of the ecosystem at the same 
time. For example, HUDSON’s most well-known title in the Japanese market is the 
Momotaro Dentetsu series, but the firm frequently provides series for all platforms and 
offers a steady stream of hits. The results of our investigation also confirmed the balanced 
strategy of Replicators.
Based on this argument, it can be seen that each of the niches plays a role in the 
health of the ecosystem and that their presence is essential and complementary for each 
other. Some inferences can also be made by assuming these niches’ roles and 
complementary relationships. For example, the ratio of shared niches has been increasing 
in the video game industry over the past 9 years (from 25% in 2000 to 39% in 2008). 
The flip side of this is that the proportion of Challengers has decreased. This is by no 
means desirable for the ecosystem. In fact, the resale of past hit titles is gradually 
increasing (from 3.6% in 2000 to 6.0% in 2008), and there is a sense of stagnation in the 
video game industry.
Of course, the decrease in Challengers is not the only cause of the stagnation, but 
based on the complementary relationships derived here, the increase in sharing of niches 
within the ecosystem implies sacrificing originality for stability. The stability-oriented 
approach of each of the players in the ecosystem may lead to a maturing of the industry. 
Therefore, hub firms must make an effort to intentionally create new niches. They must 
design their platform architecture to enable appropriate switching, provide easy-to-use 
development tools and make it easier for new niches to enter the market through niche 
support such as sales agreements. 
6. Conclusion
We have been able to make the following contributions to ecosystem research. The 
first point is that we have focused on niches that have been overlooked in ecosystem 
research to date, classifying them into four categories in a similar fashion to hub firms, 
and revealing the differences in each of their contributions to the ecosystem. The second 
point is that we were able to discuss how the roles of the four niches interact to increase 
the health of the ecosystem. The third point is that we were able to provide suggestions 
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about the form taken by keystones based on a niche perspective.
However, there are further issues to solve. One is to test external validity. The 
categories proposed here are found in the Japanese video game industry. Thus further 
research should be taken place in other industries. The other issue is to investigate the best 
niche portfolio for platform firms. If each type of niches plays a different role as we 
explained, further research question should be addressed to which proportion is good for 
the ecosystem. While too many opportunity seekers would decrease the stability of the 
ecosystem, too many defenders would decrease innovativeness of the ecosystem. Pursuing 
best portfolio is one of the most challenging issues in ecosystem research.
Footnotes
1 MPNs confirmed during the period observed were as follows. The 17 Defenders 
were EA Square, Athena, NEC Interchanel, Asmic Ace, Sammy, ChunSoft, Yuke’s, 
Nippon Ichi Software, Idea Factory, Enterbrain, SNK Playmore, Atlas, Gusto, Capcom, 
Koei, Fromsoftware and Kadokawa. The 7 Replicators were Kids Station, Electronic Arts, 
Marvelous Entertainment, SEGA, Spike, Hudson and Banpresto. The 11 Opportunity 
Seekers were AQ Interactive, Arc System Works, Success, Genki, D3 Publisher, Konami, 
Square Enix, Taito, Takara Tomy, Techmo and Namco Bandai Games.
2 Dependence is calculated by dividing the number of titles released by a publisher 
for a platform in the year t  by the total number of titles supplied that year. For example, if 
6 of the 10 titles released are for NTD, the dependence is 60%.
3 NTD’s share was 48.1% in 2006 while SCE’s was 51.9%, but NTD’s share was 
extended to 60.6% in 2007. SCE’s share fell to 39.4% and hegemony shifted to NTD 
(market scale calculated by excluding Xbox).
4 Software genres were categorized into the 11 groups of ACT, ADV, ETC, FTG, 
PZL, RCE, RPG, SLG, SPT, STG and TBL in accordance with The Annual Video Game 
Industry Report.
5 The number of yearly average released titles of Challenger, Defender, Replicator, 
and Opportunity Seeker are 1.51, 4.97, 8.64, and 14.87 respectively ( p<0.01).
Appendices: Formula Used to Compute the Performance of Niches
・Innovativenessi,t =Titlesetc,i,t /Titlesi,t
Titlesetc  : The number of ETC titles released that year, Titles : Total number of titles 







Sales: Sales of titles released that year,  Development Cost: Average development cost per 
title (by platform), i :Publisher,  t : 1, 2 …9,  k: Titles,  p: Platform
・Stabilityi =∑
t
(Productivityi,t −AverageProductivityi ) 
2/Observationtimes
i : Publisher,  t : 1, 2 …9,  Observationtimes : Frequency of a firm obseverbed during 
observation period
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